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AGENCY.

. An interesting question in regard to the apparent
of an agent has been decided by the Supreme Judicial
of Maine. Plaintiff, who was anxious to
Power of
piano to defendant, delivered it to one S, a
Agent,
Real and
Apparent
Authority

power
Court
sell a
dealer

in pianos, with instructions to leave it at defendant's house, plaintiff to see defendant subsequently
in regard to the terms of the sale. Instead of

doing this, S sold the piano to defendant, saying that it
belonged to himself, and plaintiff brought replevin.
The trial judge held that these facts were not sufficient to
give defendant title, that S was plaintiff's agent only for a
special purpose, namely, that of delivering the piano, and that
the acts of S without the scope of his authority could not bind
plaintiff. The court compared this case to the common one
of the sale of a bailed article by the bailee.
On appeal this ruling was held to be error, the fact that S
was a dealer in pianos being sufficient to estop plaintiff from
denying his authority to sell to defendant. "Whether or not
a principal is bound by the acts of his agent when dealing
with a third person who does not know the extent of his
authority depends, not so much on the actual authority given
or intended to be given by the principal, as upon the question,
what did such third person, dealing with the agent, believe,
and have a right to believe, as to the agent's authority from
the acts of the principal?" Heattl v. Stoddard, 40 Atl. 547.
CARRIERS.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina has lately decided,
by what would seem to be a piece of judicial legislation, that
Failure to
Furnish

Automatic
Couplers,
Negligence

a railroad, even in the absence of statutory
command, is bound to provide its freight cars with

couplers, and a failure to do this will be

negligence per se and subject the company to

damages for the injury to an employe engaged in operating
the old style couplers. The Act of Congress in regard to the
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new couplers will not go into effect until January I, 19oo, but
the court here thinks that the providing of automatic couplers
is necessary for the public good, and, therefore, since the
railroads can well afford it, congressional action should be
forestalled: Greenlee v. Southern RNwy., 30 S. E.,, I15.
Goods shipped by appellee over appellant's line, were seized
by a constable by virtue of a writ of attachment issued in a
suit by a third person against plaintiff's husband.
Goods,
Seizure Under While stored in the freight building, under the
Legal Process control of the constable, the goods were stolen.
The Appellate Court of Indiana, in an action against the
carrier, held that, in accordance with the leading cases of
Stiles v. Davis, I Black, IoI (I86i), and R. R.v. Yohe, 5 Ind.
i8x (1876), the carrier could set up the seizure under legal
process and prompt notice of the same rendered to the consignor as a complete defence: Indiana, L & I R. R. v. Doremeyer, 50 N. E. 497.
The decree of the Supreme Court of the United States in
the Nebraska Maximum Rate case, Symth v. Ames, 169 U. S.
Maximum 466 (1898), has been modified, upon motion, so as
to allow the State of Nebraska to impose maximum
Rates,
Rates on
rates upon specific articles carried by the railroads.
Specific
The effect of the decision was only to prevent the
Articles
state from imposing upon the railroads
unreasonably low rates as an entirety, and it did not refer to rates upon
specific goods. However, "if the state should . . . prescribe a new schedule of rates, covering substantially all
articles, and which would materially reduce those charged by
the companies, respectively, or should by a reduction of rates
on a limited number of articles make its schedule of rates, as
a whole, produce the same result, the question will arise
whether such rates . . . are consistent with the principles
announced by this court in the opinion heretofore delivered:"
Smyth et al. v. Ames et al., I8 Sup. Ct. 888.
S...2":
A statute of North Carolina, 1891, c. 320, § 4, provides
that " if any common carrier ....shall directly or indirectly
collect or receive from any person or persons a
Passengers,
Discrimination,
greater or less compensation for any services
Free Passes
. .
. than it . . . . receives from any other
person for doing him a like and contemporaneous service ....
such carrier shall be deemed guilty of unjust discrimination,
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etc." The defendant railroad granted a free pass to a member
of the legislature, for which it was indicted.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the granting of the free pass was a violation of the statute: State v.
Southern Rwy. CO., 30 S. E. 133. Douglas, J., dissented on
the curious ground that since the defendant corporation,
under the advice of counsel, honestly believed that it was
doing no wrong, and since the number of free passes
issued by it since the passage of the statute would render it
liable in statutorypenalties to the amount of some$3o,oo,ooo,
the conviction should not be sustained.
The well-known obligation upon the owners of a steam
railroad to exercise the highest degree of care which human
prudence and foresight can suggest with reference
Street
Railway,
to the condition of roadbeds, machinery, cars, etc.,
Injury to
applies with equal force to the case of street railPassenger,

ways.

However, this

degree

of

Care Required demanded from the driver of a streetcare is not
car, who is
required only to use that skill and care which would be
required of an ordinarily careful and prudent man: Stirle v.
Union Rwy. Co. (Ct. of App., N. Y), 50 N. E. 419.
O'Brien and Vann, JJ., dissent on the ground that the rule
which requires the exercise of the highest care with reference
to the selection of roadbed and machinery applies with equal
force to their use. "There should not be a higher degree of
care required in providing appliances than in using them."

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
A statute of Iowa (Code, § 1535, McClain's Code, § 2410)
provided that no railroad, express company, etc., should
Interstate transport intoxicating liquors within the State of
Commerce, Iowa without first having obtained certain certifiTransporta- cates from state officers, etc., and providing a
tion
of Liquors, punishment for violation of the statute.
Regulation by

The Supreme Court of the United States held

States
that this statute encroached upon the Federal
power to regulate commerce between the states, since, although
the statute purported to affect only shipments within the state,
yet it would be extra-territorial in effect: Rhodes v. Iowa, 18
Sup. Ct. 664.
Gray, Harlan and Brown, JJ., dissented, on the ground that
it was merely an exercise of the state's police power.
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It has recently been decided by the Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court of New York that, where the legislature
Liability of has a right reserved to alter or repeal the general
Stockholders, corporation laws, a statute imposing a liability on
Obligation of stockholders in banks for debts of the bank and
relating to banks already formed as well as those
Contracts
to be formed, comes within the right to alter or repeal, and is
therefore constitutional: Hershfeldv.Bopp, 5o N.Y. Suppl. 676.
Oleomargarine is now a recognized article of trade and
commerce and states may not pass prohibitive laws against it
merely because it might possibly be used to
Oleoniargarine,
deceive purchasers into believing that it is butter.
Regulation of Thus the Supreme Court of the United States has
Sale by States,
Interstate
decided that the Pennsylvania Act of Assembly,
Commerce
May 21, 1885, P. L. 22, providing that no substance of that nature shall be sold within the state, and the
statute of New Hampshire; 1891, c. 127, §§ 19, 2o, providing
that all oleomargarine sold shall be colored pink, are void as
regulations of interstate commerce: Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 18 Sup. Ct. 757 ; Collins v. New Hampshire, 18
Sup. Ct. 768. It will be remembered that the Supreme Court
had previously decided that the Pennsylvania statute did not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution: Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 (1887). Gray
and Harlan, JJ., dissented in both the above cases.
In Thompson v. Utah, 18 Sup. Ct. 62o, the accused had
been convicted of felony in the territory of Utah by a jury of
twelve men. He obtained a new trial, but before
t
Trial by Jury,
Ex Post Facto it took place, Utah was admitted as a state and a
statute was passed providing that certain felonies
Law,
should be tried by a jury of eight. The new trial
Number of
Jurors
took place in accordance with this statute and
accused was again convicted, the Supreme Court of Utah
affirming the constitutionality of the statute, 50 Pac. 4o9.
On appeal, 'the Supreme Court of the United States, in a
learned and exhaustive opinion by Harlan, J., decided that
the statute was an expost facto law and therefore unconstitutional and void. Brewer and Peckham, JJ., dissented.
The Constitution of North Carolina, Art. I, § 7, provides
that "no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or sep-
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arate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." The
legislature granted a charter to a warehousing
corporation which relieved the latter from any
liability for loss of goods, unless there was a provision for the same in the receipt or contract, the
corporation to have full power to make such

Warehouse

Corporation,
Charter,
Exemption

from

Liability,
constitution.

atlty

stipulations regarding loss as it should deem proper.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina held the provision
in the charter repugnant to the section of the constitution supra,
and therefore void: .aMoley ef al. v. Southern Finishing and
Warehouse Co., 30 S. E. 3.

CONTRACTS.

The familiar offer of a reward for the "arrest and conviction" of a person or persons has received a just and reasonable
"Arrest and interpretation by the Supreme Court of Maine.
conviction," Defendant was one of a number of citizens who
Reward,
agreed to pay $io each for the "arrest and conInterpretation viction of certain persons, etc," Plaintiff
conducted
an examination which resulted in the person sought for by the
advertisement confessing the crime and pleading guilty to the
indictment. The actual arrest, however, was made by a deputy
sheriff. Held, that plaintiff had earned the reward, which he
could recover from defendant, even though the terms of
the offer had not been complied with literally: Haskellet al.v.
Davidson, 40 Atl. 330.

An excellent discussion of the subject of contracts in
restraint of trade and review of the English and American
Contract in authorities thereon, is to be found in the opinion
Restraint of of Knowlton, J., of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Trade,
Massachusetts, in Anchor Electric Co. v. Hawkes,
Validity

50 N. E. 509.

There it was held that a mutual

agreement by three persons, who had just formed a corporation, not to engage in a business of like character for the
period of five years without withdrawing from the corporation,
is not such a contract in restraint of trade as will be held void
by the courts.
Defendants entered into a contract with C & Co., whereby
the latter agreed to manufacture exclusively for defendants
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for five years, with option on part of defendant
to employ them for five years more, in which
case defendants were to formally notify them before the expiration of the first five years; but in case the notice was not given,
then the contract was to terminate at the end of the first five
years. No notice to terminate the contract was ever given.
Defendant subsequently employed plaintiff under a contract
whereby it was provided that if plaintiff was discharged before
the end of his contract defendant was to pay him a certain
royalty "to the full end of the term of the agreement" made
between defendant and C & Co.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the
words "full end of the term of agreement" meant until the
ten years mentioned in the first contract had expired, and not
the five years contract : Pole v. Massaclzusetts Pluslh CO., 50
N. E. 451.
Interpretation,
"Full Term"

It has been held by the Appellate Term, New York Supreme
Court, that where there is a mere oral promise to
Pay Debt of pay the debt of another, it is not enough to show
Another,
consideration, but it must be shown that the conConsideration sideration moved to the promissor-a mere harm
Promise to

to the promissee is not enough: Perryv. Erb, 50 N. Y. Suppl.
714.

CORPORATIONS.

In the case of Hirshfeld v. Bopp, 50 N. Y. Suppl. 676, there
was raised the question whether, when judgment
of dissolution enjoins creditors from suing the
corporation, the necessity of issuing execution
against the corporation before suing the stockholders is dispensed with. It was decided in the affirmative.
Dissolution,
Suit Against
Stockholders

Although it is well established that a corporation cannot
render itself responsible for the individual debts of its officers
Ultra Vires and that securities given for that purpose are
Note,
voidable, if not wholly void, yet if, by reason of
Considerathe transaction, the corporation secures some
tion,
benefit, the mere fact that it is of advantage to the
officers will not render it ultra vires.
Plaintiff had attached land of A and B, who afterwards
formed a corporation to which plaintiff conveyed the land,
receiving in return a note and deed of trust executed in the
Benefit to
Corporation
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name of the corporation. In a suit on the trust deed it was
held that the note and trust deed were not zdtra vires, since the
corporation had received a consideration in that the lien on its
land was discharged: L. & .A1. Real Estate, Etc., Co. v. Bank
of America (C. C. App., Eighth Cir.), 86 Fed. 502.

DCEDEC NT'S

STATFS.

The amount which may be charged by a trustee under a
will for his services rests largely in the discretion of the court,
Trustee under who take into account the amount and character
will,
of the work 'to be performed. Thus a trustee,
Compensation whose sole duty it was to receive about $2000

per month from another trustee and to distribute it among
five beneficiaries, was held to deserve only one per cent., and
not the three per cent. which he claimed: Dorrance'sEstate,
40 Atl. (Pa.) 149.

Several earlier Pennsylvania cases, where three per cent.
had been allowed, were examined by the court-Stevenson's
Estate, 4 Whart. 104 (1838); Pusey v. Clemson, 9 S. & R. 204
(1822); Walker's Estate, 9 S. & R. 223 (1822); Whelen's
Appeal, 7o Pa. 410 (1872)-and were distinguished on the
ground that the services rendered by the trustees in these
cases were of a laborious nature.

EQUITY.

A bill in equity was brought to compel defendant to purchase land according to the terms of a contract. The defence
Contract to was that the title was not clear. It appeared that
Purchase
one of the deeds forming part of plaintiff's chain of
Land,
title was not acknowledged or recorded until after
Specific
Performance,
Defective
Title

the death of the grantee. However, it appeared
by parol evidence that the grantee had maintained
a continuous and adverse possession of the land
for over twenty years.
Held, that since the title by adverse possession was clearly
proved, the court would decree specific performance: Conley
et ux. v. Finn, 5o N. E. (Mass.) 460.
Although in this country courts of equity are not disposed
to grant mandatory injunctions, the effects of which are to
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Mandatory
injunction,
Ouster from
Possession of"

PealProperty,

disturb persons in the possession of real property,
yet when the title of the complainant to the
property
is clearly shown, and the court is satisfied
--that
respondent is a mere trespasser, a mandatory

injunction will issue, even though its effect is to
force respondent to relinquish his possession of
the property, and though complainant has not as yet established his title by an action at law. Such were the facts in
Pokegama Lumber Co. v. Klamath River Lumber Co. (C. C.,
N. D. Cal.), 86 Fed. 528, where a motion to modify a preliminary mandatory injunction was denied.
In this case respondents, when summoned for disobeying
the order of court, pleaded that they were acting upon the
honest belief that their course was justified, and upon the
advice of counsel. Held, that this was no excuse for disobeying the injunction, but that the court would consider it when
determining the punishment for contempt: Ibid, 86 Fed. 538.
Disobedience,

Excuse

EVIDENCE.

In Calcraft v. Guest [1898], 1 Q. B. 759, an action was
brought to try the title to a fishery. After judgment had
Documents, been rendered for the plaintiff, the defendant disPrivilege,
covered that an attorney had possession of certain
papers consisting of notes of evidence, etc., which
Secondary
Evidence
had been used in a former action against the
present plaintiff, in relation to the same fishery. Defendant
obtained possession of these documents and copied them, but
plaintiff forced him to surrender them under threat of legal
proceedings.
The Court of Appeal of England held that the documents
remained privileged and plaintiff could not be forced to produce them, but that the copies made by defendant were
admissible as secondary evidence.
In a case involving the title to land defendant offered
to prove that he and his predecessors had been in possesProof of Title, sion of the property for more than twenty years.
Conclusion A witness was asked, " Since your mother's death,
of Law,
who has been in possession of this farm that was
ossession" cultivated by your grandfather?
"
The Court of Appeals of New York held this question to
be improper, since the question whether a person is in
"possession" is a conclusion of law to be drawn from the
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facts. Cultivation of the land, fencing and general use are
relevant facts from which possession may be inferred:
Arents v. L. I R. Co., 6o N. E. 422.
In a suit for the value of the use of plaintiff's trucks, the
Value of User, sum offered by the defendant to compromise the
Offer of
matter is not evidence of the value of the user.
Compromise The value is a question of fact, but the use of such
an offer is an improper way of determining the fact: Lipp v.
Siegel-Cooper Co., 50 N. Y. Suppl. 658.

GUARDIAN AND WARD.

The Supreme Court of the United States has held in Baldy
v. Hunter, 18 Sup. Ct. 89o, that a guardian is not liable who,
Investment In being a resident of Georgia at the time of the civil
Confederate war, invested the funds of his ward in bonds of the
Bonds,
Confederate government, agreeably to the proLiability of
Guardian
visions of the Georgia statute (Laws Ga. 1861,
p. 32), which authorized such investments. The leading case
of Lamar v. Micou, 112 U. S. 452 (1884), was distinguished
on the ground that in Lamar v. Micou the guardian was a
resident of New York, was appointed by a New York court
and went South with his ward's money, presumably for the
purpose of aiding the Confederacy, while in Baldy v. Hunter
the guardian was merely obeying the law of the jbrisdiction
in which he resided.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

The now familiar doctrine that a marriage contract executed
on Sunday is valid, has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court
Marriage on of Georgia, where the question arose for the first
Sunday,
time: Hayden v. Witclell, 30 S. E. 287. The
Georgia statute, Cobb's Dig. 853, provides that
Validity
" no tradesman . . . . or other person whatsoever, shall do
or exercise any worldly work, labor or business of their
ordinary calling upon the Lord's Day." The court very
properly held that while this statute would invalidate business
contracts made on Sunday, yet it has no reference to a
marriage contract.
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INSURANCE.

The Pennsylvania Act of Assembly, May 11, 1881, P. L.
provides that all life and fire insurance policies which contain references to the application for the policy or
Statute,
to the constitution, by-laws or rules of the com"Life"
pany as forming part of the contract between the
Insurance
parties must contain a copy of the application,
Policy,
Construction by-laws,
etc., failing which, no evidence may be
given of the latter in a suit between the parties.
The Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, decided that
this act has no reference to accident insurance policies, but
that the " life" policies are only those relating to loss of life:
Standard Life, Etc., Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 86 Fed. 567. The
case of Pickett v. Ins. Co., 144 Pa. 79 (I89I), was examined
and held to contain nothing contrary to doctrine, since it was
decided upon another point.
20,

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

In a lease of land the lessor reserved the right to sell the
property at any time during the term of the lease, and the
lessee agreed, in case of such sale, "to surrender
Lease,
and deliver possession of said premises at once,
Lessor's
Power to Sell, and to release any further claim on said demised
Termination premises."
of Lease
Held, that a sale by the lessor, according to the
provision in the lease, of itself terminated the right of lessee to
remain on the premises, and that no re-entry by the lessor
was required such as would have been necessary had the
lease been construed as containing a mere agreement by the
lessee to surrender: Baxter v. City of Providence, 4o Atl.
(R. I.) 423.
The question has arisen for the first time in Indiana whether
a lease of the natural gas in land is in the nature of a lease of
the land, or whether it amounts to a sale of the
Lease of
gas- during the term of the lease.
Oas,
Natural
Following the rule suggested by two PennsylConveyance
vania cases, Wettengel v. Gormley, 16o Pa. 559
of Land,
Rents
(1894), and Swint v. Oil Co., 38 Atl. 1021
(1898),
the Supreme Court of Indiana held that the contract was
"for the use of the land for the purpose therein named,"
therefore it followed that, since, after the lease, the lessor had
conveyed the land to another in fee, the grantee was entitled
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to the rents subsequently accruing: Chandler v. Pitesburglt
Plate Glass Co., 5o N. E. 4oo.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

A case of interest to lawyers in jurisdictions containing
Employers' Liability Acts has been recently decided in
The Factory and Workshop Act, 41
Employers' England.
Liability Act, & 42 Vict. (1878), c. 16, § 82, provides that " If
Duty to Fence
Machinery, any person is killed or suffers any bodily injury in
consequence of the occupier of a factory having
Negligence,
neglected to fence any machinery ..... .the
Penalty
occupier of the factory or workshop shall be liable to a fine not
exceeding Cioo, the whole or any part of which may be applied
for the benefit of the injured person or his family as a Secretary
of State determines." A boy working an unfenced machine
was injured by reason of contributory negligence, so that he
would have been unable to recover in a civil action against his
employer.
The Queen's Bench Division decided that since tl:e Act was
aimed at the omission of the employer to fence the machine,
the mere fact that contributory negligence intervened made no
difference and that the employer was liable for the penalty:
Blenkensop v. Ogden [1898], 1 Q. B. 783.

MUNICIPALITIES.

In the New York Supreme Court, Special Term, a question
of particular interest to municipal corporations was recently
The village of Le Roy, in pursuance
Acquisition of decided.
Gas Works, Laws of 1894, c. 68o, undertook to acquire the
Popular Vote works belonging to the Le Roy Gaslight Company. A popular vote was had, application made to the court
to condemn the property, the property turned over to the
village and operated by it. After a few months this case
arose through an application by the village of Le Roy to set
the proceedings aside. The ground of the motion was that
whereas the statute provided that the question to be submitted
to the town meeting should be the direct one, whether the
property should or should not be acquired, yet the question
actually submitted in this case was, whether the taxes should
be levied on the village which were authorized by the act
relating to gas and water works. This discrepancy, it was
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contended, invalidated the proceedings. The court held that
the submission of the question provided in the act was a condition precedent, and not having been complied with, the
acquisition of the property was illegal and, furthermore,
furnished no consideration for the issuance of bonds. The
motion was consequently granted: In re Village of Le Roy,
5o N. Y. Suppl. 6I i.

NEGLIGENCE.

In Y. & I V..Rwy. Co. v. Foster,23 So. (Miss.) 5 8 1, plaintiff,
who was on a journey, telegraphed to her family to meet her
Failure
with a carriage when she returned to the station,
to Deliver
which was about two miles from her house. The
Telegram,
telegram was never delivered, through the negliDamages,

gence of the telegraph company, and plaintiff was
Cause
forced to walk from the station to her house on a
very warm day, suffering great inconvenience.
On suit against the company, it was held that the personal
injury sustained by plaintiff walking home was not the natural
and proximate result of defendant's negligence, and that all
that could be recovered was the statutory penalty of twentyfive dollars for failure to deliver the telegram, the cost of the
telegram and the amount it would have cost plaintiff to have
hired a conveyance from the station to her house.
Proximate

A municipality is not bound to insure the safe condition of
its side walks. Therefore it is not liable for injuries to a
person who slips on a loose brick, when ti'e brick
Sidewalk,
Loose Brick, is in its proper position and there is nothing to
Precaution

show that it is in any way unsafe, even though

the sidewalk is depressed and there are loose bricks lying at a
point near the place where the accident happens : Bucher v.
City of Soutlz Bend, 50 N. E. (Ind.) 412.
The Supreme Court of Georgia has decided that it is not
negligence per se for a passenger on a street railway to depart
Stepping from from a car on the wrong side, crossing the parallel
Street Car,
Parallel
Tracks

track on which the cars run in the opposite direction. Therefore where the company had not
provided any guard ropes or other appliances to

prevent passengers from leaving the cars on the left hand side,
and plaintiff, who was deaf, stepped off and was struck by a
car coming down the other track, the question of plaintiff's
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and defendant's negligence was properly left to the jury:
Atlanta St. Rwy. v. Bates, 30 S. E. 41.
PRACTICE.

Starr v. Silverman, 5o N. Y. Suppl. 657 (Supreme Court,
Appellate Term), was an attempt to maintain an action for
Action
conversion in place of an action ex contractu.
ExContracta, The defendant agreed to pay to plaintiff two
Conversion dollars per thousand for tobacco delivered. The
delivery was made but the defendant failed to pay. It was
held that the action must be in form ex contractu.
In Enright v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 5o N. Y. Suppl. 609,
an application was made for a commission to take the deposiDepositions, tion of a physician. It was apparent from the
Competency application that his statements would probably be
ruled out and the application was therefore refused. On
appeal to Appellate Division, Supreme Court, the ruling was
affirmed.
QUASI-CONTRACTS.

The celebrated case of Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Central
Transportation Co., decided by the Supreme Court of the
Ultra Vires United States is reported in 18 Sup. Ct. 8o8. As
Lease,
Recovery for
Benefits
Conferred

mentioned in 37 Am. L. REG. N. S. 374, the
amount which the court allowed the Central
Transportation Company to recover represented
merely the value of the cars, equipment,
etc., and

a small sum of money which was paid to the Pullman Company at the time of the lease, together with interest. Nothing
was allowed for the valuable contracts and patents transferred
to the Pullman Company, and the lower court's method of
measuring the damages by the value of the Central Transportation Company's stock at the time of the lease was held to be
error. (For a discussion of the case see note in this number.)
REAL PROPERTY.

The curious effect of a general warranty in a conveyance of
land upon the acquisition of an easement over that land, is
Conveyance, illustrated by a late case decided by the Supreme
Estoppel,
Effect on

Easement

Court of Rhode Island.

Lots X and Y were adjoining. A, the owner
of X, conveyed it to the plaintiff's predecessor in

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

REAL PROPERTY (Continued).

title, the deed containing a covenant of general warranty.
Afterwards A acquired lot Y, which, by various mesne conveyances, came into the hands of defendant, who, together
with his predecessors, exercised the right of way over lot X
for more tha twenty years. Held, that defendant did not
gain any easement over lot X, since the covenants of warranty
in the deed to plaintiff's predecessor estopped A from claiming any right of way over lot X when she became owner of
lot Y, and equally estopped defendant, who claimed under
her: Hodges v. Goodspeed, 40 Atl. 373.
A, the husband of B, being seized in fee of real estate, made
a contract in writing (in which B did not join) to convey to C.
Dower,
On his failure to do so, C commenced a suit in
Acquisition
Title by

of equity for specific
performance.
seii

While
this suit
hl

was pending, A and B joined in a conveyance of
Outstanding the land to D, the agreement being that D should
Equity
reconvey whenever called upon to do so. D
having reconveyed the land to A in fee, C obtained the title
by virtue of the contract, and the question was (in a suit to
quiet C's title) whether B had any dower right in the land.
The Supreme Court of Indiana held that, after the reconveyance from D to A, B became possessed of an inchoate
interest, but that this interest became subject to whatever
infirmities attached to the new title her husband acquired by
the reconveyance. This infirmity was the equitable title in
favor of C, and B's dower right did not avail against it.
Therefore C had a clear title: Sharts v. Ralloway, 50
N. E. 386.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has decided
that a wife has no interest in the proceeds of her husband's
land which has been taken under the power of
Eminent
eminent domain during his life: Flynn v. Flynn
Domain,
Effect on
etal., 5o N. E. 65o. The court compares the situaInchoate
tion to a case where a building has been burned
Dower Right down on the husband's land and insurance money
Husband,

recovered, or where the land has been washed away by reason
of the negligent maintenance of a neighbor's dam, for which
payment has been made. In neither of these cases will the
court take into consideration the inchoate dower right of the
wife, and the same principle is to be applied in a case of
eminent domain. The New Jersey case of Wheeler v. Kirtland,
27 N. J. Eq. 534 (875),
is characterized as an exception to
the rule.

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

REAL PROPERTY (Continued).

3lizmo v. Haiway, 5o N. Y. Suppl. 686 (Supreme Court,
Appellate Term). It is provided by statute that when a
building becomes untenantable the lessee is reLease,
leased from rent "unless otherwise expressly
Duty to
Repair,
provided." In this case the lease said that in case
Reasonable of fire the tenant should give notice thereof to the
Time
landlord who should repair "forthwith."
A fire
occurred, notice was given, and at the end of nine days the
tenant removed, no repairs having been made. On suit by
the tenant to recover a deposit made by him to insure performance of the lease, it was held that the provision in the
lease waived the benefit of the statute, but that in view of the
provision as to repairing " forthwith" nine days was an
unreasonable delay and released the tenant.
In Taylor v. N. Y. & H. R. Co., 50 N. Y. Suppl. 697, the
Supreme Court decided that while a railroad company may
affect a particular piece of work in the nature of a
Railroads,
Abutting
permanent improvement without liability to abuttProperty,
ing property owners for consequential damages, it
Damage
may at the same time be held liable for temporary
damage rendered necessary by the main operation. The
N. Y. & H. R. Co., which had its roadway in the centre of
Fourth Avenue, New York City, in front of the plaintiff's
premises, was directed by the legislature to raise its grade and
the work was done under the direct control, not of the railroad,
but of the municipal authorities. For these reasons the
defendant was held not liable for the damage to plaintiff's
easement of light and air, etc. But while the above work was
going on it was necessary to erect a temporary structure
alongside the embankment to allow the passage of trains. It
being shown that some damage was thereby caused to the
plaintiff, the judgment of the court below, in favor of the
defendant, was reversed and the cases cited by it distinguished
on the ground that the temporary structure was not necessary
to the completion of a legal and authorized public improvement, but was only necessary for railway purposes.
An Indiana Statute (Burn's Rev. St. § 7255) gives all
,Structure," persons furnishing erecting machinery for any
Oil Well,
house, mill, etc., "or other structure," a lien.
Mechanics' Held, that the word " structure" is broad enough
Lien
to include an oil well, together with its tubing,
derricks, etc.: Haskell et al. v. Gallagher et al., 5o N. E.
(Ind.) 485.
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SALES.

Plaintiff delivered a cash register to one M under a contract
of conditional sale, whereby part of the -purchase money was
promissory
Conditional paid, the balance being represented by
Sale,
notes. M mortgaged the register to defendant,
Mortgage,
and default being made in the payments to plaintiff,
ightof ethe

latter obtained judgment against M on the
notes and levied upon the register
in defendant's

hands. The Supreme Court of Ohio held (i) that M, although
a vendee under a conditional sale only, had sufficient property
in the chattel to mortgage it, and (2) that plaintiff, by obtaining judgment against M, had waived his right to take
advantage of the terms of the conditional sale in regard to the
return of the register itself, but had elected to treat M as its
owner, and that, therefore, the rights of the mortgagee were
superior to those of plaintiff: Albright v. Meredith, 50 N. E.
719.

WILLS.
The will of X cohtained the following clause: "To the
priest of St. Mary's Church of Lancaster, New York, of the
Bequest to sum of $6oo, for which masses shall be said for
Religious
the repose of my soul." This was attacked on the
Association
ground that the sum exceeded one-half the testatrix's estate and was therefore invalid under Laws of i86o, c.
36o, prohibiting a bequest of more than one-half of an estate
to a religious association. It was held that this bequest was
not to an association, but to the officiating pastor, and therefore did not contravene the statute: In re Zimmerman's Will,
5o N. Y. Suppl. 395 (Surrogate's Court).

